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University of Edinburgh
ANN COPESTAKE
Stanford University
(Received 23 July 1996 ; revised 18 March 1997)
In this paper, we explore the interaction between lexical semantics and pragmatics.
We argue that linguistic processing is informationally encapsulated and utilizes
relatively simple ‘ taxonomic’ lexical semantic knowledge. On this basis, defeasible
lexical generalisations deliver defeasible parts of logical form. In contrast, pragmatic
inference is open-ended and involves arbitrary real-world knowledge. Two axioms
specify when pragmatic defaults override lexical ones. We demonstrate that modelling
this interaction allows us to achieve a more refined interpretation of words in a
discourse context than either the lexicon or pragmatics could do on their own.
1. Introduction
Much recent work on lexical semantics has been concerned with accounting
for the flexibility of word meaning. Some cases of this involve regular
polysemy, where words systematically have multiple senses. This covers a
diverse range of phenomena including verb alternations (e.g. causative-
inchoative), denominalised verbs of various types (e.g. whistle, fax), and the
less well-studied noun alternations: count}mass senses of words denoting
animals and their meat (lamb, turkey, haddock, etc.), the container}contents
alternation (box, case, etc.) and so on. In this paper, however, we will be
mainly concerned with more subtle cases where it is inadequate to postulate
distinct word senses and where the interaction between words is crucial. One
example is the phenomenon which Pustejovsky (e.g. 1991, 1995) has called
logical metonymy where additional meaning seems to arise for particular
verb}noun or adjective}noun combinations in a systematic way. For
example, (1a) usually has the same interpretation as (1b).
[1] An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of SALT V. We are grateful
to Ted Briscoe, Nicholas Asher, Dan Flickinger, Danie' le Godard, Ivan Sag and to
participants at SALT and the 1995 AAAI Spring Symposium on Representation and
Acquisition of Lexical Knowledge for their helpful comments on material presented here.
We have also benefited from anonymous JL comments. This work was partially supported
by the ESPRIT Acquilex-II, project BR-7315, grant to Cambridge University, and by the
ESRC grant, project number R000236052, to The University of Edinburgh.
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(1) (a) Mary enjoyed the book.
(b) Mary enjoyed reading the book.
The apparent generalisation about enjoy and similar verbs is that semantically
they always take eventualities. When the syntactic complement is an object-
denoting NP, as in (1a), the sentence is nevertheless interpreted to mean that
an event is enjoyed.
Pustejovsky argues that it is inadequate to postulate different word senses
to account for logical metonymy and that the meaning of examples such as
(1a) must be derived compositionally, as a result of the interaction of the
semantics of the verb and the noun. The specific enjoyed event is supplied by
the noun based on its lexical semantic structure. However, as we will discuss
in detail below, context can affect the interpretation: (1a) will probably not
be interpreted as (1b) if we know that Mary is a goat, for instance. Thus a
purely lexical account of logical metonymy is inadequate. The challenge is to
account for processes such as logical metonymy compositionally in a way
which allows for their partly conventional nature, within a general framework
of linguistic description that recognizes the role of pragmatics.
The starting point for our approach to the lexicon is the recognition that
syntactic realisation and word meaning are often closely interrelated: for
instance, it is not an arbitrary fact that lamb is a mass noun when it refers to
(an unbounded quantity of) meat, and a count noun when it refers to the
animal, or that enjoy can take a nominal complement. An account of the
lexicon which does not incorporate lexical semantic information is
inadequate because it misses generalisations in syntactic and morphological
behaviour. There are, of course, exceptions to generalisations based on
semantics and cases where grammatical behaviour has to be stipulated:
because of this lexical representation must utilize a formalism which allows
for defaults. But we do not want to postulate an unconstrained account of
lexical semantics which involves arbitrarily complex inference and open-
ended world knowledge. Because of this we take a methodological position
where lexical semantic information is only postulated if it is required to
account for generalisations about grammatical behaviour or if a purely
pragmatic account seems untenable because an effect is (partially) con-
ventional. We will try and make this approach more concrete in this paper,
by a detailed discussion of borderline cases, such as the lexicon’s contribution
to logical metonymy.
We make the same basic assumptions about the lexicon as Briscoe et al.
(1990) and Copestake (1992), which argue for an interaction between lexical
semantics and pragmatics in which purely linguistic processing is infor-
mationally encapsulated and utilizes relatively simple ‘ taxonomic’ lexical
semantic knowledge. Lexical semantic information and real world knowledge
are not seen as necessarily distinct. Instead, lexical semantic information is
a strictly limited fragment of world knowledge, encapsulated in the lexicon,
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which interacts with knowledge of language and may be partially
conventional. For example, the entry for the animal sense of goat might
locate it in a lexical semantic taxonomy under a node animal. It is, of course,
part of real world knowledge that goats are animals, but animal is only
included in the lexical semantic hierarchy because it is an appropriate locus
for linguistically-relevant generalisations (for instance, animal-denoting
nouns are generally count rather than mass). In contrast, as far as we know,
there is no linguistic justification for a node bovid. In this account, lexical
semantics is integrated with morphology, syntax and compositional
semantics by utilising a uniformly unification-based approach comparable to
that assumed in HPSG. The formalism is not extended for lexical semantics :
for example, the lexical semantic hierarchy is encoded using types in the same
manner as the syntactic hierarchy. Lexical semantics contributes to processes
such as logical metonymy, allowing linguistic processing to deliver a partly
defeasible logical form, which can be overridden by open-ended pragmatic
reasoning.
However, the account in the earlier work was incomplete, because the
interaction with pragmatics was left open. Defaults were simply used to aid
in the encoding of static lexical generalisations. Thus the use of lexical
defaults in syntax and morphology (e.g. Flickinger 1987, Evans & Gazdar
1989) was extended to lexical semantics. But it was not related to the notion
of defeasibility in the logical form, making it unclear how the unification-
based techniques served to distinguish defeasible from indefeasible parts of
logical form.
Here we review the earlier account and argue for a revised treatment of
defaults, which allows default results of lexical generalisations to persist as
default beyond the lexicon and thus be available to the interface with
pragmatic reasoning. This extends the formalism, but as we have argued
elsewhere (Lascarides, Briscoe et al. 1996), this extension is desirable for
purposes other than encoding lexical semantics. We will make specific
proposals for the formalisation of the pragmatic component, and illustrate
how this allows us to account for alternative interpretations of words in a
discourse context. The decision as to whether the lexical default survives at
the discourse level or not will be modelled in a formally precise way in the
nonmonotonic logic for pragmatic reasoning. Just two rules will be needed
to encode the communication link between default reasoning in the lexicon
on the one hand, and default reasoning at the discourse level at the other. By
providing this link between lexical operations and discourse ones, we will
explain how words are interpreted in discourse, in a way that neither the
lexicon nor pragmatics could achieve on their own.
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2. Generalisations with exceptions
We will begin this section by looking at logical metonymy in more detail.
Traditionally the only way to handle the dual behaviour of verbs such as
enjoy is to assume that it has two lexical entries, one of which takes a VP
complement and the other an NP, and to relate the different senses by
meaning postulates. However, quite apart from the undesirability of
proliferating senses, this does not explain why the usual reading of (1a),
repeated below, is (1b), and it misses the generalisation to other cases where
a noun phrase is interpreted as an event, such as those in (2).
(1) (a) Mary enjoyed the book.
(b) Mary enjoyed reading the book.
(2) (a) John began a new book.
(b) John finished the beer.
(c) Bill enjoyed the film.
(d) After three glasses of champagne, John felt much happier.
It also does not allow for cases where an NP and a VP are conjoined, such
as (3).
(3) Mary enjoys books, television and playing the guitar.
Pustejovsky (e.g. 1991) proposes that examples such as (1a) involve logical
metonymy. He treats nouns as having a ‘qualia structure’ as part of their
lexical entries which, among other things, specifies possible events associated
with the entity. For example, the telic (purpose) role of the qualia structure
for book has a value equivalent to reading. When combined with enjoy, a
metonymic interpretation is constructed where the particular sort of event
which is involved is determined from the qualia structure, which results in an
interpretation for (1a) equivalent to (1b).
In section 3, we outline an account which is broadly similar to
Pustejovsky’s. In our treatment of (1a), the verb provides the basic
metonymic interpretation, which can be glossed as (4a) with the logical form
shown in (4b).#
(4) (a) Mary enjoyed some event associated with the book.
(b) dy, e, e«[enjoy(e, Mary, e«) g act-on-pred(e«, Mary, y) g book(y)]
The constant act-on-pred is general over a broad class of predicates which we
will not attempt to precisely delimit here, but which includes watch, eat,
smoke and so on as well as read. We assume that the noun phrase provides
the specific predicate involved, via the telic role of the qualia structure, but
[2] Here and in the following examples we ignore temporal information for the sake of
simplicity.
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unlike Pustejovsky we will treat this as a default. Thus (1a) has the logical
form shown in (5), where * indicates defeasibility :
(5) dy, e, e«[enjoy(e, Mary, e«) g *read(e«, Mary, y) g book(y)]
Given the basic metonymic interpretation represented in (4b), the fact that
the event that was enjoyed was done by Mary to the book is indefeasible, and
so it can never be overridden. But the information that the event that’s
enjoyed is a reading one is defeasible, and in principle this default can be
overridden. We will explicate in this paper the conditions under which this
happens.
Note that if the noun does not have a conventionalised telic role, the
sentence is odd (out of context), as in (6).
(6) ?Mary enjoyed the pebble.
On our account, such sentences will not be blocked by the grammar, but will
result in a logical form which contains the very general act-on-pred, which
will be pragmatically anomalous, unless context provides a more specific
interpretation.
2.1 Lexical and non-lexical exceptions
The reason for the use of defaults is that the generalisation about the
interpretation on the basis of the telic role has two classes of exceptions. The
first case comprises lexical exceptions and is exemplified by (7) :
(7) Mary enjoyed the dictionary.
Although dictionaries are books, (7) is unlikely (again out of context) to have
the interpretation (8) because dictionaries are usually used as reference books
rather than read.$
(8) Mary enjoyed reading the dictionary.
In Briscoe et al. (1990) and Copestake (1992), such cases are allowed for by
using a default inheritance hierarchy in the lexicon. So, although dictionary,
like book, could inherit its lexical semantic characteristics from a more
general class such as literature, the telic role of the qualia structure specified
for dictionary corresponds to refer to, and this overrides the inherited value
read. The use of defaults in the lexicon was taken to be strictly part of the
description language, and led to a conventional lexical entry expressed as a
typed feature structure. Using defaults is an important part of our theory of
[3] Some people, including ourselves, find (7) and similar examples less than fully acceptable :
in Copestake & Briscoe (1995) it was argued that this is because enjoy is not fully acceptable
with point-like events such as refer to. However we will ignore this here, since it is not
relevant to our main point, and acceptability judgements differ considerably between
speakers.
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lexical structure, since this allows concise specification of lexical entries and
avoids redundancy. However, purely lexical defaults do not extend to the
second class of exceptions, which are triggered by context, or wider world
knowledge. For example, (9a) means (9b) and not (9c).
(9) (a) My goats eat anything. He really enjoyed your book.
(b) The goat enjoyed eating your book.
(c) The goat enjoyed reading your book.
Similarly, our interpretation of Mary enjoyed the book is different if we know
that Mary is a goat, and is revised if we subsequently learn this.
Briscoe et al. (1990) allow for the second type of defaults by introducing
Reiter’s (1980) consistency operator M into the part of the logical form
derived from the telic role. Thus the logical form given for (1a) was (10) ; it
can be glossed as ‘‘ the event enjoyed is reading, in the absence of information
to the contrary’’.
(10) dy, e, e«[enjoy(e, Mary, e«) g Mread(e«, Mary, y) g book(y)]
This account was intended as a placeholder in the absence of a proper
treatment of pragmatics. Even so, it has some major disadvantages. Firstly,
the assumption that goats don’t read is itself a default, because of contexts
such as fairy stories. Assuming that this default is encoded in the same logic,
it is unclear how one could ensure that the axioms on M resolve the conflict
between the default logical form and the default world knowledge in favour
of the latter, especially since the two defaults are logically unrelated.
Secondly, the consistency operator is introduced into the grammar as an ad
hoc stipulation. There is no connection between the defeasibility of the telic
role with respect to its inheritance in the dictionary case and its defeasibility
in the logical form. The pragmatic overriding in the goat example is due to
the subject of enjoy. But the object can also have this effect, as shown in the
examples in (11), given that book made out of marzipan and book with blank
pages can’t be lexicalized (unlike dictionary).
(11) (a) John enjoyed the book made out of marzipan.
(b) ?John enjoyed the book with blank pages.
Intutively, these cases are just like the dictionary one, in that they arise
because the object is an abnormal book. In fact, we hypothesize that all cases
of overriding of the logical form arise because the context is such that the
entity is being used in an abnormal way. Ideally, therefore, we would like the
defeasibility in the logical form to arise from the default nature of the usual
purpose specification made in the lexicon. But, because defaults in Briscoe et
al. (1990) are simply part of the lexical description language, they could not
persist beyond the lexicon, and the defeasibility in the logical form had to be
stipulated.
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It is implausible that these problems could be resolved by adopting a
purely lexical account, at least on the assumptions about the nature of the
lexicon that we discussed in the introduction, since arbitrarily complex
reasoning on the context could be involved in deciding that the subject can’t
read or that the object is unreadable.% This should be apparent for the
examples in (11), where no straightforward compositional mechanism would
allow the modifiers to cause book to be marked as unreadable. In such cases,
open-ended inference may be required about books and the nature of
reading. Even for the simpler case of non-human subjects, it is implausible
that a selectional restriction will work. Specifying that the subject of read
must be human is both too general since it fails to explain the anomaly in
(12), and too specific since it rules out the acceptability of (13) in the context
of a fairy story.
(12) ?The illiterate man read the book.
(13) The goat put her spectacles on and started to read the book to her
kids.
Furthermore, no purely lexical strategy can cope with uses of anaphor, such
as (9a) (since marking the pronoun as human would cause it to fail to bind
with the antecedent), or cases of revision of interpretation in the light of
subsequent information (such as being told that Mary is a goat sometime
after being told that she enjoyed the book).
One alternative to a purely lexical account would be to claim that the
interpretation of the event in metonymic sentences was purely pragmatic (i.e.
that the logical form for (1a) was simply (4b), with the interpretation of the
predicate act-on-pred being completely pragmatically determined). Such an
approach is suggested by Hobbs et al. (1990) for metonymy in general
(although logical metonymy as such is not discussed), with weighted
abduction on pragmatic knowledge being used to determine the value of the
underspecified predicate. Copestake (1992) argues that this is inadequate for
metonymy in general, because of syntactic effects that sometimes accompany
metonymy. But serious challenges to this line also exist for the treatment of
[4] Of course, one could propose that the lexicon has access to arbitrary context and that open-
ended lexical inference is possible. Pustejovsky & Boguraev (1993) assume a fully general
knowledge representation language is needed for lexical representation and Strigin (1995)
argues for abductive inference in the lexicon. In our view, there are two main problems with
such proposals, or at least with the terminology, if such processing is described as purely
lexical. The first is that open-ended reasoning is not solely connected with linguistic
processing: it is needed for making inferences generally. Thus if the lexicon itself has this
capability, it will be necessary to duplicate information and capabilities which are also
available to the non-linguistic reasoning component. The second is that a non-trivial
interface would be required between the sort of formalism necessary to implement open-
ended inference and syntactic representation. It thus seems to us preferable to reserve the
term lexicon for the component which integrates closely with the rest of the grammar and
to assume that open-ended reasoning on context is part of the function of the pragmatic
component and not of the lexicon.
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logical metonymy (see also Briscoe et al. 1990). First, an adequate theory has
to account for the usual interpretations. The corpus analysis described in
Briscoe et al. showed that for most metonymic examples the telic role of the
noun gives an appropriate reading. What’s more, the explicit mention of the
verbal predicate is relatively rare in such cases – that is, examples such as (1a)
are more common than (1b). On the other hand, the contexts in which the
interpretation would not have been predicted by the qualia structure were
informationally-rich (a concept which we will be able to formalise in section
4). A purely pragmatic theory could only account for this data by assuming
that some interpretations were privileged; for example, one would need a rule
that encapsulates that enjoy the book by default means enjoy reading the book.
But this would cause problems with prioritorising defaults. One would have
to impose prioritorisations on world knowledge that weren’t independently
motivated, because the conflicting knowledge that was pertinent to the case
would be logically unrelated. In the case of weighted abduction, it is thus
unclear how one can assign the weights that guide inference in a principled
way. In section 3 we will offer an account where the priorities on
interpretation necessary to account for these examples will follow from
general principles about the integration of the lexicon and pragmatics.
Furthermore, there is some evidence which suggests that logical metonymy
is partially conventionalised and triggered by the lexical item, rather than
knowledge of the context. For example, (14) is strange, even if the hearer and
the speaker both know that the doorstop is a book, which would not be
predicted if the purpose were pragmatically determined by real world
knowledge of the entity:
(14) ?John enjoyed that doorstop.
Further support for the idea that there is some conventional aspect to logical
metonymy is given by data discussed by Godard & Jayez (1993). Pustejovsky
argues that for verbs like begin, two possible interpretations arise from the
qualia structure of the noun: besides the telic interpretation there is an
agentive interpretation, which corresponds to the event which is charac-
teristically involved in the creation of an entity. We have only considered the
telic interpretation so far, since sentences with enjoy do not usually appear to
have a default agentive interpretation. However for many other verbs both
telic and agentive interpretations may be possible, depending on context.
There are however some restrictions on this, for example, the sentences in
(15) only get the agentive reading (i.e. begin constructing) and not the telic
one (begin travelling through}over}along).
(15) (a) Kim began the tunnel.
(b) Kim began the bridge.
(c) Kim began the freeway.
Consideration of comparable examples with commencer leads Godard &
Jayez (1993) to suggest that the telic interpretation is only available for
394
pragmatics and word meaning
objects which are being in some sense consumed or affected by the action.
However, they then have to assume that books are affected by being read.
Since it is unlikely that real world properties of books would lead to this
conceptualisation, these exceptions support the hypothesis that logical
metonymy is partially conventionalized.
As far as we know, no pragmatic theory which accounts for this data has
been proposed, but we can sketch what it would have to include. As outlined
above, there would have to be a means of providing an ordering on possible
instantiations of the underspecified metonymic predicate, either by weights
or defaults. Predicting the instantiation could not be done solely on the basis
of world knowledge of the object denoted, but would require access to the
description that was used in that utterance, as shown by examples such as
(14). In order to predict the oddity of (14), the computation of the
underspecified predicate would have to depend on knowledge of the usual
purpose of the class of objects denoted by doorstop, not on real world
properties of the doorstopping book itself. To account for the examples in
(15), we would have to assume that the instantiation process had additional
constraints which would have to be lexically or syntactically triggered, since
begin travelling through the tunnel, etc. are perfectly acceptable. Thus a purely
pragmatic account is only possible if pragmatics has access to language-
specific information and once this move is made it is not clear how the
account could be constrained or falsified.
Therefore we wanted to pursue the alternative hypothesis that the interface
between the lexicon and pragmatics is via a partially defeasible logical form,
where the nature of the metonymic event is proposed by the lexicon. Instead
of the account proposed in Briscoe et al. (1990), we make use of a new
formalisation of defaults, which allows them to persist beyond the lexicon.
The default nature of the part of the logical form contributed by the telic role
is not simply stipulated, but arises directly from the lexical default. The
interface with pragmatics is set up so that reasoning with real world
knowledge can override the defaults that are proposed lexically. Thus we can
provide an integrated account of the interaction of lexical semantics and
pragmatics. We describe this account in sections 3 and 4, but first we briefly
review some other data which we believe require a similar treatment.
2.2 Adjectives, compound nouns and null complements
Some examples of adjective interpretation can be treated along the same
broad lines as enjoy. Pustejovsky (e.g. 1991, 1995) and others have argued
against distinct lexical entries for fast, for its usages in fast car, fast
programmer, fast motorway and so on. Instead, it is possible to assume just
a single lexical entry for fast, where its different ‘senses ’ arise from the
process of syntagmatic co-composition. The lexical generalisation is much
like that for enjoy : adjectives like fast predicate over the telic role of the
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artifact (although fast can also apply to other parts of the qualia). So the
lexical account predicts that fast car means a car which goes fast, and fast
programmer means a programmer who programs fast, via the same entry for
fast.
But as before, some discourse contexts trigger exceptions to this
generalisation. In (16), fast programmer means programmer who runs fast,
and not programmer who programs fast (cf. Pollard & Sag (1994 : 330) and the
interpretation of good linguist).
(16) (a) All the office personnel took part in the company sports day last
week.
(b) One of the programmers was a good athlete, but the other was
struggling to finish the courses.
(c) The fast programmer came first in the 100m.
As in the enjoy examples, the pragmatic component needs to know that the
interpretation of fast programmer as a programmer who programs fast is a
default.
Another case where a default interpretation apparently arises from the
lexicon}grammar is the interpretation of compounds. For example, there
appears to be a generalisation that when a noun that refers to a solid
substance combines with a noun that refers to a solid artifact, the compound
refers to the artifact made of the substance (wickerwork chair, plastic toy,
wrought iron table, mahogany dresser). On the other hand, some compounds
can only be interpreted in context. Downing (1977) gives an attested example
where someone was asked to sit in the apple juice seat in a situation where
there was a table already set with a glass of apple juice by one place. Here
apple juice seat means ‘‘seat with a glass of apple juice in front ’’, but
obviously this meaning cannot be listed in the lexicon. Even if a compound
has an established interpretation, in context there may be another possibility.
In (17), taken from Bauer (1983 : 86), garbage man can be taken to mean ‘a
man made out of garbage’ by analogy with snowman:
(17) In the back street where I grew up, everybody was poor. We were so
poor that we never went on holiday. Our only toys were the garbage
cans. We never built sandcastles, only garbage men.
Examples like these have led to the suggestion that noun-noun compounds
should be assigned a representation where the relationship between the two
halves of the compound is left completely unspecified and further
interpretation should be left to the pragmatic component (e.g. Downing
1977, Bauer 1983). Although it is undoubtably true that pragmatics and
context play a major role in interpreting novel compounds and that there are
pragmatic constraints on the possible interpretations, there are serious
objections to suggesting that this is the only mechanism involved. Without
further elaboration this gives no explanation of the fact that the majority of
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compound nouns behave in a semi-regular manner. Some compounds which
should be allowed on pragmatic grounds do not occur: for example,
*blacksmith hammer and other such compounds are not acceptable when
taken as referring to an instrument used by a person with the given
occupation. The possessive is used instead (blacksmith’s hammer). Fur-
thermore, languages vary in productivity with respect to compounds: Italian,
for instance, has much more restricted compounding than English, but does
not prohibit it completely. In contrast, in German compounds are formed
even more freely than in English: for example, a noun-noun compound could
be used rather than a possessive for the blacksmith’s hammer example. There
are other cases where literal translations from German to English, even of
non-lexicalised compounds, are strange: for example, Terminvorschlag has to
be translated as suggestion for a date rather than ?date suggestion. It seems
unlikely that this can be explained by any cultural or pragmatic effects. So,
just as with logical metonymy, there are some linguistic constraints on
compounds which must be represented.
Even if a purely pragmatic account were attempted for unestablished
compounds, others, such as garbage man, must be explicitly listed. It is
unlikely that it is the combination of denotations with the underspecified
predicate that has an established interpretation, since in British English
rubbish is the normal term rather than garbage, but rubbish man is not
established in all dialects. So we must assume that the lexicon has to contain
some compounds with their established meaning. But sentences containing
such compounds would be ambiguous, because the corresponding pro-
ductively generated underspecified compound would still have to be
available. And if established compounds are listed in the lexicon, then any
generalisation about the behaviour of classes of compounds should be
accessible to the lexicon, since many established compounds have an
interpretation that belongs to one of the standard patterns.
We therefore assume that generalisations about the interpretation of
classes of compounds, such as substance}artifact compounds, are made in
the grammar. However, such generalisations are only defaults. For instance,
the ‘‘made-of ’’ relationship between the nouns in compounds like wickerwork
chair can be overridden in discourse :
(18) At school, everyone worked on crafts in groups round a big table,
sitting on brightly coloured chairs. To make sure everyone could reach
the materials, the groups used particular chairs : the wickerwork chairs
were made of red plastic, for example.
These observations make noun-noun compounds a good candidate for the
use of defaults which persist beyond the lexicon, along broadly similar lines
to the discussion of logical metonymy above.
The last case we will consider here is that of verbs such as drink, which has
an intransitive use that implies a narrow-scope, existential drinkee. However,
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there is a strong preference that in the absence of information to the contrary
that (19a), (20a) means (20b), and (21a) means (21b) (Fillmore 1986).
(19) (a) John drinks all the time.
(b) John drinks alcohol all the time.
(20) (a) We’ve already eaten.
(b) We’ve already eaten a meal.
(21) (a) I spent yesterday afternoon baking.
(b) I spent yesterday afternoon baking cakes or bread. (as opposed to
ham or potatoes)
However, in context these preferences can be overridden by potentially
aribitrary background information:
(22) The doctor thinks that John might have diabetes. He drinks all the
time and excessive thirst is a symptom of diabetes.
(23) My tongue is no longer paralysed so I can eat again.
(24) As long as we’re baking anyway, we may as well do the ham now too.
(Silverstein, cited in Fillmore 1986)
It seems implausible to assume that pragmatics alone is responsible for the
association of alcohol with the verb drink, in preference to other drinkable
substances, or that flour-based products are pragmatically more likely to be
cooked by baking than other foodstuffs. Under a pragmatic account it would
also be difficult to explain why, for example, Were you guzzling? does not
imply a meal, even though guzzle« implies eat«. We therefore assume that
these default preferences for the null complements in (19a), (20a) and (21a)
have been established as part of the conventional meanings of the relevant
verbs. They therefore make a good candidate for the use of persistent
defaults in the lexicon. The preferences for particular interpretations of the
null complement can then be encoded as conventional, while ensuring that
these interpretations are overridable by pragmatic information.
3. Persistent Default Unification and the lexicon
We use a typed feature structure formalism comparable to that used in
HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994) to implement the grammar and the lexicon. The
standard method of implementing default inheritance within unification-
based approaches to linguistic representation is to use some variety of default
unification (see Copestake 1993 for an overview). This is usually taken to be
an operation in the description language, which allows one feature structure
(FS) to incorporate only the consistent information from another FS.
Inconsistent information is ignored, rather than causing failure of the
operation as in normal unification. But since default unification returns a
normal FS, there is no distinction between default and non-default
information in the result. Thus, for example, there is no way of specifying
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that the telic role for the literature class is defeasible. The lexical entry for
dictionary could override it (in fact dictionary could override any part of the
information it was inheriting) but there is no way in which it can be stated
to be defeasible more generally.
There is another problem with using this operation as a basis for lexical
organisation. Any definition of default unification which does not distinguish
non-default and default information will be order-dependent, as shown by
Young & Rounds (1993) and Lascarides, Briscoe et al. (1996). This
compromises the declarativity of the formalism, but is not an insuperable
problem for the lexicon, because all the entries to be unified are in a fixed
hierarchy and an inheritance order can be stipulated. But in a discourse
situation, one cannot predict which pieces of information are to be unified,
in advance of starting the discourse interpretation process. So the interface
between discourse processing and order dependent lexical processing would
have to take into account the order in which the unification operations are
done, which is impractical. It is therefore necessary for our account to
distinguish default from non-default information, and also useful to do so,
since it allows generalisations to be stated as exceptionless where this is
appropriate.
Lascarides, Briscoe et al. (1996) defined an order independent form of
default unification over typed default feature structures (TDFSs). TDFSs are
typed FSs where default information is marked as such, and the default
unification operation is one where defaults in a TDFS, if they survive at all,
survive with the marking that they are default. So this unification operation
is one which permits defaults to persist as default beyond the lexicon’s
boundaries, in the sense that one can distinguish in the GS which parts are
default. Because of this, the operation is known as Persistent Default
Unification (PDU).
TDFSs are TFSs augmented with a slash notation which demarcates the
indefeasible parts from the defeasible. Values to the left of the slash are
indefeasible and those to the right defeasible (indefeasible}defeasible). We
abbreviate this to }defeasible where the indefeasible value is completely
general, and omit the slash when the defeasible and indefeasible values are
the same. So, for example, the TDFS (25) states that the value on the feature
F is by default G:a, although the type of the FS (t) and the existence of the
feature F are non-default.
(25) 9tF¯ }[G¯ a]:
When a default value survives PDU (notated 
!"
), it does so with the slash
annotation. The details of PDU are given in Lascarides, Briscoe et al. (1996)
but two examples are given in (26).
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(26) Some examples of PDU
Where t« is more specific than (Q) t :
9tF¯ a: 
!"
9t«F¯ }b:¯ 9
t«
F¯ a: Defeat of DMP
9tF¯ }a: 
!"
9t«F¯ }b:¯ 9
t«
F¯ }b: Specificity}The Penguin Principle
These indicate that PDU validates defeat of Defeasible Modus Ponens
(DMP), and unlike Young & Rounds’ definition, it also validates Specificity
(i.e., defeasible information on more specific TDFSs overrides conflicting
defaults on more general TDFSs).
Lascarides, Briscoe et al. (1996) show one way of encoding the inheritance
of telic roles in PDU. This is given in (27).&
(27) The telic role of artifacts
artifact
qualia telic = eventuality9 9
represent-art
qualia telic = /perceive9 9
visual-rep
qualia telic = /watch9 9 literaturequalia telic = /read9 9
dictionary
qualia telic = /refer9 9[film] [book]
So, for example, the telic role of literature is read and this is inherited by
book, but for the subclass dictionary it’s refer-to. This is superficially similar
to the previous descriptions in Briscoe et al. (1990) and Copestake (1992),
apart from the slash, but here default inheritance can proceed in any order
to compute the telic roles. This use of defaults thus allows for exceptions due
to lexically specified classes of ‘abnormal ’ books, such as dictionaries : but
unlike the previous account the use of persistent defaults extends this so that
individual abnormal books and normal books put to abnormal uses are also
allowed for, as we will see below.
We should emphasize that our concern here is not to represent the meaning
of artifact-denoting nouns, but only to represent aspects of semantics which
[5] For expository purposes, the QUALIA feature is shown at the top-level of the sign, but it
should actually be taken as being a part of the semantics. The use of distinct types for
individual lexical entries is also a simplification which we adopt here for convenience, since
the details of the feature structure geometry are irrelevant to this paper.
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contribute to processes such as logical metonymy. A philosophically
adequate theory of meaning would probably treat knowledge of the purpose
of artifacts as analytic : for example, it is an essential property of books as a
class that they are readable, while it is not necessary that they have a
realisation as solid individual physical objects. But we make no attempt at
representing such distinctions here.
(28) The generalisation for verbs like enjoy
coercing
cat subcat =
sem = [e][R(e, x, e′)g P act-on-pred(e′, x, y) g n ]
np
sem =  n  [Q(y)]
qualia telic =  P
Copestake & Briscoe (1995) show how to state the lexical generalisation
concerning enjoy, that it predicates over the telic role of the artifact as is
shown in (28).' When enjoy take a non-event denoting object (which
instantiates the cat subcat ‘ slot ’), the event that is enjoyed is instantiated
via the telic role, as indicated by the coindexation *P in (28). In the figure,
R is the predicate associated with the verb itself (e.g. enjoy) *P and *n
indicate coindexation (we are using letters rather than integers here for
readability). The instantiated form is shown in (29). In these figures the
logical form is shown in a linearised notation for readability, rather than in
its actual encoding in TDFSs. It is important, however, that we use the same
formalism throughout, since it means we can use PDU to construct the
semantics, just as normal unification is often used in FS based frameworks.
(29) The sign for enjoy instantiated with information from the NP for the book
(ignoring tense and the determiner)
coercing
cat subcat =
sem = [e][enjoy(e, x, e′)g P (e′, x, y) g n book(y)]
np
sem =  n
qualia telic =  P act-on-pred/read
We have shown the path qualia telic explicitly, to illustate that it is
the predicate read which is slashed. The information that there is some
metonymic event and that the predicate involved is a subtype of act-on-pred
is not default, and cannot be overridden. Nor can one override the values of
[6] Unlike Pustejovsky (1995) and Briscoe et al. (1990), this account assumes that the fs for
enjoy when it takes an object which denotes an individual entity is distinct from the form
which takes an event (although both inherit from a common underspecified form). The
‘coercion’ from object to event is represented as internal to the verb semantics. Some of
the reasons for preferring this account are given in Copestake & Briscoe (1992, 1995) and
Godard & Jayez (1993). However the differences between this and the alternative account
where the NP itself undergoes coercion are largely irrelevant here.
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the arguments in the atomic formulae. However the effect of the slash will be
that of the contribution of read to the semantics of the sentence can be
contextually overridden.
The semantic representation assumed is InL (Indexed Language, Zeevat et
al. 1987), which has a direct equivalence to DRT. We use DRT here, since
this is the semantic representation scheme that underlies the pragmatic
component DICE (Discourse in Commonsense Entailment, Lascarides &
Asher 1991, 1993 ; see section 4.1 below) that we link the grammar to. We
assume that DRS-conditions that arise from elements on the RHS of the
slash notation are embedded in an operator n in the DRS conditions, and this
operator receives a semantics which ensures that nu doesn’t logically entail
u ; rather, nu is true just in case u is suggested by the lexicon as the default.
So the logical form of (1a) repeated here as (30a), derived via PDU is (30b).
(30) (a) Mary enjoyed the book.
(b) e, e´ , x, y
mary(x)
enjoy(e, x, e´ )
book(y)
act-on-pred(e´ , x, y)
*read(e´ , x, y)
For brevity, we have omitted WFFs of the form nu when u also holds.
We now have the task of assigning a semantics to DRS-conditions of the
form nu. This must indicate that they are derived via defaults in the lexicon.
PDU is formalised in a conditional logic. So the way defaults behave in PDU
is determined by constraints on a function n
pdu
that is part of the model, and
which takes worlds and propositions to propositions. n
pdu
represents
assumptions about the behaviour of defaults in the lexicon: n
pdu
(w, p)
encodes what according to w, normally follows from p. So, let K be DRS, and
let K− be the DRS K with all the DRS-conditions of the form nw removed.
Then we can define the semantics of nu as follows:
(31) M,wz
f
nu in DRS K just in case for all w« in n
pdu
(w, OK−P), there is
a gY f such that M,w«z
g
u.
DRS conditions of the form nu aren’t assserted to be true in the actual world
w, since according to the assumptions about n
pdu
in PDU, it is not necessarily
the case that w ` n
pdu
(w, p). So in (30b), the logical semantics does not entail
that the event that was enjoyed was a reading. Rather, the formula nread(e«,
x, y) records that the lexicon suggests this. However, (30b) does entail that an
event was enjoyed by Mary.
Thus we have utilized the fact that defaults persist, by assigning the default
results of PDU a different truth conditional status in logical semantics from
the indefeasible results. The partial defeasibility of the logical form indicates
that read is the best guess on the basis of lexical information for the specific
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enjoyed event (the information arises from the lexical semantics of book, but
overriding it in pragmatics does not entail any abnormality of the specific
book involved, just that the book was being enjoyed in an unusual way). It
is up to the pragmatic component to assess whether read should be inferred
as the appropriate event in the discourse context. The lexicon has suggested
this, but clues from the more open ended pragmatic reasoning may dispose
of this proposal, and replace it with another. We’ll come to this in the next
section.
4. L inking the lexicon to pragmatics
4.1 DICE
We’ll link the lexicon and grammar to a theory of pragmatics : specifically
DICE (Discourse in Commonsense Entailment, Lascarides & Asher 1991,
1993). This is a model of discourse interpretation which encodes real world
knowledge like goats don’t read, and more generally, it encodes background
information that is used to compute the rhetorical links between segments of
discourse. The representation of discourse structure produced by DICE are
segmented DRSs (SDRSs) (Asher 1993). An SDRS is a recursively defined
structure which connects DRSs together using rhetorical relations like
Elaboration, Contrast and so on. These relations impose coherence
constraints on the discourse, by imposing restrictions on the semantic
relationships between the propositions being connected. The details of these
are in Asher 1993, Lascarides & Asher 1993 and Asher & Lascarides 1995.
In these papers, we have exploited the semantics of these relations, as
specified by their coherence constraints, to model the way the truth
conditional semantic content of a sentence is affected by the way it connects
to the discourse context. Modelling this captures the intuition that speakers
expect hearers to accommodate semantic content during discourse pro-
cessing, that is additional to the compositional semantic content provided by
the grammar. Indeed, modelling this accommodation of semantic content is
the primary motivation for using rhetorical relations in the representation of
the semantics of discourse. However, here we use the coherence constraints
on rhetorical relations for the more specific purpose of reasoning about when
lexical defaults should be overridden. Simply put: lexical defaults will
normally be overridden when they lead to a bad discourse.
DICE uses the default logic Commonsense Entailment (CE) (Asher &
Morreau 1991) to reason about pragmatic interpretation. This logic exploits
conditions of the form: A"B, which means If A then normally B. So one
could represent Goats don’t read as the schema:
E Goats Don’t Read: goat(x)"|read(e,x, y)
Although this rule stipulates knowldge that is intuitively compelling, it is
unliikely that one would want to record a rule like this directly in a practical
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system for pragmatic reasoning, since it’s too specific. However, it can be
derived automatically via the axioms in CE from a more general default such
as ‘‘Only humans read, normally ’’, so long as this more general default was
represented in CE in the appropriate way.( At any rate, we use ‘Goats Don’t
Read’ for illustrative purposes here, for investigating the circumstances when
pragmatics overrides lexical defaults.
DICE also uses default rules to compute the rhetorical relations that
connect DRSs together to form an SDRS. All these rules are of the form
given in (26). Here ©s,a,bª is the update function which can be glossed ‘‘b
is to be attached to a with a rhetorical relation, where a is part of the
discourse structure s built so far ’’. ‘‘Some stuff’’ stands for syntactic and
semantic information about s, a and b and R is a particular rhetorical
relation:
(32) (©s,a,bª g some stuff)"R(a,b)
Details of these discourse attachment rules appear in Lascarides & Asher
(1991, 1993) and Asher & Lascarides (1995).
The nonmonotonic validity of CE (rE) has several nice properties. There
are three that are relevant here. First, it validates DMP: If one default applies
and its consequent is consistent with the KB, then it is nonmonotonically
inferred. Second, it validates the Specificity Principle : if conflicting defaults
have their antecedents verified, then the consequent of the default with the
most specific antecedent is preferred. Finally, for each deduction A rEB there
is a corresponding embedded default in the object language (that is, a
formula in which one " occurs within the scope of another) which links
boolean combinations of the formulae A and B, and which is verified to be
true. We gloss this embedded default formula as "(A,B). So "(A,B) means
A rEB. This amounts to a weak deduction theorem. The object language
formula "(A,B) means that A nonmonotonically yields B in the meta-
language.
4.2 Linking PDU and DICE
To link the PDU treatment of lexical productivity to pragmatic knowledge,
we add two axioms to DICE. First, Defaults Survive captures the intuition
that defaults in the lexicon normally survive at the discourse level :
E Defaults Survive: nu"u
Second, we need an axiom that ensures that when the consequents of
discourse processing and lexical processing conflict, the discourse processing
wins. This is what happens in (33), for example, where the PDU prediction,
[7] Compare ‘‘Only humans read, normally ’’ with the proposed selectional restriction on read
mentioned in section 2.1. We assume this rule is default, and it isn’t conventionalized in
the lexicon for the reasons given earlier.
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that the event enjoyed was a reading, is overridden by the conflicting
pragmatic information stipulated in the "-rule ‘Goats Don’t Read’.
(33) The goat enjoyed the book.
Let KB
h
be obtained from the knowledge base KB, by removing all the DRS
conditions of the form nu (h stands for ‘‘hard information’’). Then
Discourse Wins states : when this KB yields a nonmonotonic conclusion w,
then normally this survives the KB with conditions like nu added to it
(whatever the logical relation between u and w) :
E Discourse Wins: (nug"(KB
h
,w))"w
This rule is called Discourse Wins, because by the Specificity Principle with
Defaults Survive, if w conflicts with u – e.g., w is |u – then w is
nonmonotonically inferred and u is not, even if nu was in the KB. In other
words, the clues from discourse context, if there are any, override conflicting
results of PDU. On the other hand, if u and w are compatible or logically
unrelated, they will both be inferred by DMP. So Discourse Wins also serves
to model how discourse information can further refine the information about
meaning obtained from the lexicon.
Let’s now investigate how this affects the interpretation of the above
examples. First, consider (1a) again, whose logical form expressed in DRT is
(30b). Both are repeated as (34a, b).
(34) (a) Mary enjoyed the book.
(b) e, e´, x, y
mary(x)
enjoy(e, x, e´)
book(y)
act-on-pred(e´ x, y)
*read(e´, x, y)
There are no "-rules which give information about the kinds of things that
Mary enjoys. Moreover, Defaults Survive applies with the following
instantiation of the schema: nread(e«,x, y)" read(e«,x, y). So by DMP on
this rule, one infers that Mary enjoyed reading the book.
Now compare this with (33), whose logical form is similar to (34b). Both
are presented in (35).
(35) (a) The goat enjoyed the book.
(b) e, e´, x, y
goat(x)
enjoy(e, x, e´)
book(y)
act-on-pre(e´, x, y)
*read(e´, x, y)
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First consider the nonmonotonic consequences on KB
h
. ‘Goats Don’t Read’
applies, but Defaults Survive doesn’t with respect to KB
h
, because KB
h
contains no conditions of the form nu. So by DMP on ‘Goats Don’t Read’,
|read(e«,x, y) follows nonmonotonically from KB
h
. That is, "(KB
h
,|read(e«,
x, y)) holds. In the KB as a whole, the instantiation of Defaults Survive given
in (36) applies just as before. But in contrast to (34a), so does the
instantiation of the schema Discourse Wins given in (37) :
(36) nread(e«,x, y)" read(e«,x, y)
(37) (nread(e«,x, y)g"(KB
h
,|read(e«,x, y)))"|read(e«,x, y).
So by the Specificity Principle on (36) and (37), |read(e«,x, y) is inferred.
4.3 Discourse context
We would need more "-rules to infer that the event enjoyed as an eating in
(35a). But in (38), we could infer that the goat enjoyed eating the book via
the rhetorical structure of the discourse and the existing DICE rules which
compute that rhetorical structure (Asher & Lascarides 1995).
(38) My goat ate the whole library.
He really enjoyed your book.
The relevant rules for discourse attachment, which are taken from Asher &
Lascarides (1995), are given below.
E Narration: ©s,a,bª"Narration(a,b)
E Axiom on Narration: *(Narration(a,b)! ea A eb)
E Distinct Common Topic:
*(Narration(a,b)! dc(ciagcibg|(aib)g|(bia)))
E Elaboration: ©s,a,bªgSubtype(a,b)"Elaboration(a,b)
E Axiom on Elaboration: *(Elaboration(a,b)!aib)
We write the formal rules here so that the logical relations between them (for
example, which rules are default and which aren’t, and which defaults are
more specific than others) are clear. However, it is easiest to understand what
they convey in words. Narration stipulates that if one is attaching b to a with
a rhetorical relation, then normally, that relation is Narration. The Axiom on
Narration and Distinct Common Topic stipulate coherence constraints in
using this relation. The axiom states that when Narration(a,b) holds, then
indefeasibly, a’s event precedes b’s (written ea A eb). Distinct Common Topic
stipulates that a and b must have a distinct common topic c (cia means
c is a topic for a). So, Narration together with its Axiom and Distinct
Common Topic capture the intuition that normally the textual order of
events match their temporal order and the propositions have a distinct
common topic. Elaboration states that if b is to be attached to a and b is a
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subtype of a, then normally Elaboration(a,b) holds; its Axiom says that a
must be a topic of b. Subtype(a,b) can be inferred via rules given in Asher
& Lascarides (1995), but we omit them here for the sake of simplicity.
Intuitively, Subtype(a,b) holds just in case the event described in b is a
subtype of that described in a in that the former entails the latter. For
example, the goat devoured the library is a subtype of the goat ate the book
and the goat enjoyed eating the book is also a subtype of the goat ate the book.
Consider how these rules apply in (9a) above. The DRS b representing the
second sentence in (9a) must be attached on the DRS a representing the first.
The anaphor he must be identified with an accessible antecedent, and the
SDRT constraints on accessibility restrict this to being the goat. So we can
assume that b represents the goat enjoyed your book, whatever rhetorical
relation is used to attach b to a. Therefore, the default rule ‘Goats Don’t
Read’ applies just as in the analysis of (27). But the discourse context a can
also be used to provide clues about how to expand the metonymy. Suppose
one were to resolve the metonymy to something of the form enjoy V-ing your
book, where V is not related to eating. Then the only default rule that would
apply for computing the rhetorical relation would be Narration. But
Narration(a,b) can hold only if a distinct common topic can be found for a
and b. In SDRT, this is obtained by generalising the propositions in the
narrative to produce a single predicate argument structure. If the V is
unrelated to eating, however, this topic will be very general : it’s something
like the goat did things. In Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe (1996), we
argued that if the reader can’t compute an explanation for why a particular
proposition is the topic of the discourse, then the discourse is at best coherent
but weak.
In DICE, pragmatic interpretations of sentences that lead to weak
discourse coherence are avoided if possible, via the Interpretation Constraint
below (Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe 1996) :
(39) Interpretation Constraint
(a) (©s,a,bªgInfo(a,b)
(b) "
KB
(b«,weak(seb)))
(c) "|b«
In this schema, Info(a,b) is a gloss for all monotonic information about a
and b, and "
KB
(A,B) means "(KBgA,B) and |"(KB,B) (that is, B
nonmonotonically follows from the KB augmented with A but not from the
KB alone). So in words, the Interpretation Constraint states that if (a) b is
to be connected to a with a rhetorical relation, and b and a are both true, and
(b) if the KB that includes not only the update task of b to a, but also the
information b«, nonmonotonically leads to a discourse of only weak
coherence or no coherence at all, then normally (c) b« doesn’t hold. This rule
applies to (38) whenever b« is an assumption that the metonymy in b is
resolved to an event that is unrelated to eating, because as we have stated,
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such an assumption produces a weak narrative on the grounds that no
explanation can be computed for why the topic of the discourse is so general.
However, the Intepretation Constraint does not apply if the metonymy is
resolved to an event which is related to eating. This is because in this case,
the event condition of eating in a is a subtype of the event condition of enjoy
eating in b, and the book in b is taken to be a part of the library in a. Because
of this Subtype(a,b) is true, and so Elaboration as well as Narration applies.
By Specificity, Elaboration(a,b) is inferred, and so there’s no need for a
distinct common topic between a and b anymore: Elaboration dictates that
a is the topic of the discourse. This change in topic improves the coherence
of the discourse.
Consequently, DMP on the Interpretation Constraint rules out all
resolutions of metonymy apart from eat, and so KB
h
yields a nonmonotonic
conclusion that eat(e«,x, y) holds. Therefore at the discourse level, the
following rules apply and conflict (assuming e« can’t be both a reading and
eating) :)
(40) nread(e«,x, y)" read(e«,x, y)
(nread(e«,x, y)g"(KB
h
, eat(e«,x, y)))" eat(e«,x, y)
So by the Specificity Principle, eat(e«,x, y) is inferred. This leads to the
nonmonotonic conclusion that Elaboration(a,b) holds via Subtype and
Elaboration.
These examples provide further motivation for conventionalising some
aspects of metonymy. For suppose we were to compute metonymy solely
within pragmatics. Then the nonmonotonic logic which is used to compute
pragmatic inference would have to compute the relevant predicate of the
event that is enjoyed, rather than checking that conventional clues about this
predicate are coherent. In other words, we would need to replace the
information in (27) and (28) above with "-rules in DICE, because this
information wouldn’t be conventionalized anymore, and the fact that the
usual purpose of a book is to read it needs to be represented somewhere in
order to interpret the metonymic construction enjoy the book.
Following this pragmatic strategy of encoding the information in (27) and
(28) as "-rules is technically possible, but representation of pragmatic
information will on the whole be much trickier. For example, to interpret
(35a) correctly, the real world knowledge that goats don’t read must win over
the "-rules concerning generalisations about enjoy on telic roles, since these
"-rules would apply when interpreting (35a), but we would not want to infer
their consequents. This means that the antecedent of the rule that goats don’t
read would have to be more specific; otherwise the logic won’t resolve the
[8] In fact, ‘Goats Don’t Read’ applies as well, but we don’t mention it here since the
consequent of Discourse Wins in this case is strictly more specific than that of ‘Goats Don’t
Read’.
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conflict among the default rules that apply when interpreting (35a) in the
right way. Indeed, there is currently no logic for nonmonotonic reasoning
which resolves conflict between unrelated default rules without assuming
prioritorisation mechanisms that are extraneous to the logic itself. So ‘Goats
Don’t Read’ would have to be replaced with something like (42), so that it
could compete with the "-rule (41) which would replace the information in
(27) and (28) relevant to enjoy the book.
(41) (enjoy(e,x, e«)gliterature(y))" read(e«,x, y)
(42) (enjoy(e,x, e«)ggoat(x)gliterature(y))"|read(e«,x, y)
This rule is self-evidently extremely specific, but a rule of this form is required
for Specificity to hold, and this inference pattern is required to obtain the
right interpretation of (35a).
Instead of following this pragmatic strategy, we have spread the load
between pragmatics and the lexicon, and we have encoded communication
links between them. By doing this, we can ‘ loosen up’ how we represent
information. We can ensure that regardless of how the pragmatic
information is represented relative to the lexical information – in other
words, regardless of whether the pragmatic rules that apply are more specific
than the relevant lexical rules, and regardless of whether they’re not related
at all – the pragmatic rules will always win over conflicting lexical clues.
This means the relevant rule for representing ‘Goats Don’t Read’ can have
a very general antecedent, and yet we guarantee that it will always win over
conflicting lexical information, such as that given in (27) and (28).
4.4 Adjectives, compounds and null complements revisited
Having discussed the case of enjoy in some detail, we’ll now revisit the other
examples given in section 2.2 more briefly.
Copestake & Briscoe (1995) treat fast in a very similar way to enjoy. The
coindexation between the telic role of the object NP in the subcat list and the
event that fast predicates over in the semantics is inherited via PDU from a
lexical generalisation over the class of adjectives of which fast is a member
(other members are slow, careful, long). In this case the telic role of
programmer is [x] [}program(e,x)], where x is coindexed with the ‘normal ’
variable. But this is defeasible : it’s on the RHS of the slash. The truth
conditional effects of this are represented in the DRS (34) for fast
programmer, where the formula program(e,x) is within the scope of n :
(43) x, e
programmer(x)
fast(e)
act-pred(e, x)
*program(e, x)
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So the lexicon proposes that the event that fast predicates over is program,
but this may be overridden by pragmatic information.
Consider (16), repeated here as (44), where fast programmer means
programmer who runs fast.
(44) (a) All the office personnel took part in the company sports day last
week.
(b) One of the programmers was a good athlete, but the other was
struggling to finish the courses.
(c) The fast programmer came first in the 100 m.
The axioms Defaults Survive and Discourse Wins capture this. In outline, the
Interpretation Constraint in DICE blocks the assumption that the fast
programmer in (44c) is different from the programmers mentioned in (44a, b)
because this would lead to a weak discourse. Consequently, Subtype and
Elaboration yield the intuitive attachment that (44c) is an Elaboration of
(44a, b).
As we have mentioned, the fast programmer must identify a unique
programmer from (44a, b). There are two programmers, who have been
differentiated only on the grounds of their athletic ability. So verifying the
uniqueness condition is possible only if fast is equated with athletic ability.
Thus "(KB
h
, fast(e«)grun(e«,x)) holds (where programmer(x) `KB
h
). So
Defaults Survive and Discourse Wins both apply, and they have the
consequents program(e«,x) and run(e«,x) respectively. Assuming that e« can’t
be both a programming and a running, these rules conflict. And so by the
Specificity Principle, run(e«,x) is nonmonotonically inferred. In contrast, in
‘neutral ’ (i.e., uninformative) discourse contexts, DMP on Defaults Survive
will yield that fast programmer means programmer who programs fast.
Turning now to compounds, a general schema for endocentric compound
interpretation is shown in (45), with an underspecified predicate, pred,
relating the indices of the constituents.
(45) General schema for endocentric noun-noun compounds
compound-noun-schema < binary-rule
lex-noun
orth =  1 ,  2
syn = noun-cat
sem =  3 g 5 gpred ( x ,  y )
qualia =  7  nomqualia
!
lex-noun
orth =  1
syn = noun-cat
sem =  3 P ( y )
qualia = nomqualia
lex-noun
orth =  2
syn = noun-cat
sem =  5 Q ( x )
qualia =  7
,
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Most compounds will instantiate one or more of the subschemata which
inherit from this schema with the predicate relating the parts of the
compound marked as persistently default. An example of a more specific
schema is shown in (46).
(46) A compound noun subschema
made-of-substance-schema < compound-noun-schema
lex-count-noun
sem =  3 g 5 gpred/made-of-substance ( x ,  y )
qualia = artifact
!
lex-uncount-noun
sem =  3 P ( y )
qualia = substance
,
lex-count-noun
sem =  5 Q ( x )
qualia = artifact
This schema defeasibly specifies that the compounding predicate is made-of-
substance.
The structure in (47) shows the result of instantiating the schema in (46)
with wickerwork chair (ignoring the substructure in wickerwork).
(47)
lex-count-noun
sem =  wickerwork( 4 )gchair( 6 ) gpred/made-of-substance ( 6 ,  4 )
qualia = artifact
In normal contexts, this interpretation will stand. However, since the
compounding predicate is defeasible, it can be pragmatically overridden
along the same lines as the examples discussed above. In a context such as
(18), an alternative interpretation is found, since the default interpretation is
contradicted by the context. (18) is repeated in (48).
(48) At school, everyone worked on crafts in groups round a big table,
sitting on brightly coloured chairs. To make sure everyone could reach
the materials, the groups used particular chairs : the wickerwork chairs
were made of red plastic, for example.
The pragmatic interpretation of were made of red plastic blocks the inference
that the chairs were made of wickerwork. Moreover, the discourse structure
of (48) – and in particular, the line of reasoning in DICE that leads to
Elaboration – yields a nonmonotonic inference from KB
h
that wickerwork
chair is to be interpreted as chair which is sat on by someone who works on
wickerwork. So by the Specificity Principle on Defaults Survive and Discourse
Wins, the established meaning of wickerwork chair is overridden in (48) ;
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instead it means chairs made of red plastic, which are sat on by people working
with wickerwork. In contrast, for the novel use (49), it is more plausible to
assume that the interpretation suggested by the grammar is completely
underspecified.
(49) Please sit in the apple juice seat.
The discourse information serves to instantiate this, in order to make an
interpretation possible in this context. In other contexts, where it was not
apparent that the seat could be distinguished in this way, interpretation
would fail.
Finally, let us briefly discuss the treatment of null complements in this
framework. We suggested in section 2.2 that one could use persistent defaults
to encode the preferences for the interpretation of ‘null complements ’ when
eat, drink and bake are used intransitively. Such a treatment would produce
the representation (50b) or (50a) (again, ignoring temporal information and
making the simplifying assumption that the adverbial all the time can be
interpreted as always) :
(50) (a) John drinks all the time.
(b) x, y, e
john(x)
drink(e, x, y)
always(e)
*alcohol(y)
In the absence of any discourse context, DMP on Defaults Survive will yield
an interpretation where John drinks alcohol all the time. However, the
interpretation of (50a) in the context given in (51) will be different (cf. (22)
above).
(51) The doctor thinks that John might have diabetes. He drinks all the
time.
Assuming that one knows that a symptom of diabetes is a continual thirst,
background knowledge in this case supports as Explanation relation between
the constituents, so long as the second sentence is interpreted as John drinks
fluids all the time. So discourse information will override the lexical default
in a similar manner as for previous examples.
Briscoe et al. (1990) claim that lexical generalisations are only cancelled in
contexts that are informationally rich. We have illuminated in a formal
setting exactly what this means. According to Defaults Survive and Discourse
Wins, a lexical generalisation nu can be cancelled only if "(KB
h
,|u). So a
discourse context is ‘ informationally rich’ if, independently of all default
lexical generalisations, there are discourse clues which enable one to
nonmonotonically conclude the exception.
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5. Conclusion
Many lexical generalisations have exceptions, which are triggered by
information outside the lexicon. This poses a challenge to monotonic
accounts of the lexicon and to those which treat defaults as an abbreviatory
convention and restrict their use to the description language.
Using an account of lexical organisation involving persistent default
unification, we showed that links to a pragmatic component were possible
with just two axioms: the first ensures that lexical generalisations normally
apply in a discourse context, while the second ensures that normally,
discourse information about how a word should be interpreted – if there is
any – wins over defaults from the lexicon. This accounted for exceptions to
lexical generalisations in a discourse context in two areas : logical metonymy
and compound nouns. Moreover, the axioms clarified in a formal setting the
claim in Briscoe et al. (1990) that exceptions to lexical generalisations can
only be triggered by discourse contexts which are informationally rich.
This is just a first step towards linking lexical and pragmatic knowledge.
More needs to be done to achieve a robust theory of lexical interpretation in
a discourse context. Nevertheless, these first results indicate the kinds of
operations that one needs in both components for them to communicate
properly. In the grammar and lexicon, persistent defaults are needed, while
in pragmatics, the Specificity Principle and embedded defaults are a crucial
part of the account.
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